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Abstract: 
 
We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the 
ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the 
framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) in which 
trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity in response 
to an initial offer of money within a two-person game. An incentive is conveyed 
both by means of variations in the multiplier applied to the first player’s initial offer 
and by giving the first player the opportunity to insure themselves against the 
possibility that the second player will fail to reciprocate their initial offer. 
Measured trust is strongly responsive to both these incentives. Thus third parties 
have the ability to influence the outcome of the game, not only, as in the analysis 
of Charness et al (2008), by punishing failure to reciprocate and rewarding ‘good’ 
initial offers, but also by offering protection which strengthens the first player’s 
risk efficacy, or ratio of assets to risk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 There is now a large literature attesting to the importance of social capital, 
and specifically of interpersonal trust, in determining the level of economic 
efficiency and economic development.  Following Putnam’s demonstration (1995) 
of the importance of social networks in determining relative rates of development 
in northern and southern Italy, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Whiteley (2000) 
have demonstrated statistically that indices of trust are significantly correlated 
with inter-country variations in economic growth, and La Porta et al. (1997) have 
shown that trust is positively associated with judicial efficiency and the absence 
of corruption.  As the literature has developed, so a range of alternative 
measures of trust have evolved. The original practice of assessing trust by 
means of attitudinal questions (such as the World Values Survey’s  ‘Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?’) has been supplemented by more precise and 
easier-to-interpret experimental methods, which have been used to measure 
trust and its correlates in environments as diverse as Zimbabwean resettlement 
schemes (Barr 2003), Ugandan villages (Mosley and Verschoor 2005) and the 
Harvard first-year economics classroom (Glaeser et al. 2000). From these 
experimental studies have come a range of findings on the correlates of trust, 
which suggest, in particular, that trust levels tend to be higher amongst the 
better-off, the more educated, older people, and those in denser social networks. 
  
The big gap which remains in all of this is the question of how trust-
relationships are made and broken. Even if we know that richer and more 
educated individuals and societies trust one another more than the poorer and 
less educated, we do not know why, nor do we know a great deal about the 
processes by which distrust can be turned into trust, either in the political or in 
the interpersonal sphere. One interesting aspect of this is the role, if any, of 
market processes in incentivising trust. For whereas markets exist for most 
factors of production which are valuable in the development process, such as 
labour, physical capital and human capital in most of its forms, trust, scarce 
resource though it is, is classically a commodity which cannot be bought with 
money. What is still more interesting is that, on the rather casual evidence which 
is available, the application of standard non-market methods for increasing the 
degree of public trust in a service – such as the increasingly tough audit 
procedures being used for ‘quality assurance’ in health and education – often 
turns out not to increase the degree of trust which the public profess in that 
service (O’Neill, 2002). The question of what actually will motivate trust, and 
indeed what will demotivate it, is therefore germane. In this paper we tackle this 
question by comparative experimental analysis of the determinants of trust and of 
trust-building processes, both between separated individuals and within groups.  
 
Our point of departure is that by trusting behaviour we increase our 
vulnerability to the actions of others; that is, we expose ourselves to an increased 
risk that others will exploit us, in the hope of deriving benefit from the possibility 
 - 4 - 
that they will do the opposite and behave in a mutually equitable manner. Thus, a 
situation in which trust between two individuals does not exist because of mutual 
fears about possible exploitation by others may be replaced by a situation in 
which those fears are discounted sufficiently for a trusting interchange to occur. 
The idea which we explore here is that one element in distrust can be removed 
by the discovery, or the deliberate making available, of evidence which reduces 
the costs of trusting for the truster. The literature on this point (eg Barr, Dickhaut 
and McCabe 1995, Glaeser et al. 2000, Barr 2003) treats trust-increasing 
evidence as coming from the truster’s past ‘social history’, that is her personal 
background and her experience of other people including the trustee. Our main 
thesis in this paper is that trusting behaviour may derive from other sources 
which do not relate to evidence from the past. In particular, trust may be induced 
because the trustee provides a pledge of future good behaviour which is 
believed, or because she or a third party provides a material incentive which 
reduces the costs of trusting for the truster. We call trust induced by this means 
incentivised trust. Incentivised trust is trust which derives from the making 
available of evidence which reduces the truster’s risk efficacy, or the reserves 
which the truster has at her disposal to cope with breach of trust, by contrast with 
affective trust which does not depend on evidence of any kind1 but rather on 
instinct or emotion. Examples of incentivised trust may be given from a number 
of contexts: guarantees given to consumers to refund the purchase money on 
defective goods encourage uncertain consumers into the market, and peer-
monitoring arrangements act as bona-fides to encourage uncertain lenders to 
lend even to those without collateral. 
 
 
2.  Existing literature and hypotheses 
 
 Much of the experimental literature on trust consists of variations on the 
classic two-person ‘reciprocity game’ of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
(‘BDM’)(1995)2. In this game, the first player, player A, is handed an initial 
amount of money, average $10, of which she can allocate any proportion to a 
player B whom she cannot see or contact. This amount is then tripled by the 
experimenter, playing the role of banker, to give player B an incentive to invest in 
her, and player B then decides how much of this tripled amount to give back. 
Later variations on this model, both in the form of computer simulations 
(Anderhub et al 2002; Cox 2004) and empirical experiments (Glaeser 2003; 
Charness et al 2008; Cochard et al 2004), have repeated the basic two-shot 
                                               
1 The concept of affective trust is taken from Faulkner (2008). Faulkner contrasts between 
affective trust, which is trust in which the truster feels betrayed if her expectations of the trustee’s 
behaviour are not met, and predictive trust, in which the decision to trust is based on objective 
evidence concerning the likelihood that those expectations will be met. Our concept of 
incentivised trust is very close to Faulkner’s predictive trust, in the sense that the decision to 
place this form of trust in another person is based on material rather than affective 
considerations. Our concept of incentivised trust adds the idea that trust can be based on pledges 
or indications of good behaviour, or actual insurances against trust being betrayed. 
2
 For reviews of results from the BDM game see Barr (2003) and Mosley and Verschoor (2005) 
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BDM game one or more times, and in some cases revealed players’ identities to 
one another, with a view to increasing the amount of information available to 
trusters as they decide how much trust to give to the trustee.  An important 
further step forward is taken by Charness et al (2008), who introduce into the 
game a third party empowered to punish a responder who has been excessively 
selfish, which is one way of incentivising trust. They find that these penalties 
have a strong and significant effect on the amounts offered and returned.  
 
We develop the approach of Charness et al (2008), allowing the 
experimenter, or third party, to offer not only penalties for those who do not 
reciprocate but rewards for those who do. We do this in two ways, first by varying 
the multiple by which player A’s initial offer is multiplied as it reaches player B, 
and second by offering player A insurance against the possibility that her initial 
offer will not be reciprocated. Both of these incentives increase risk efficacy – 
protection against the possibility of trust not being reciprocated – and help the 
first mover, player A, cultivate a reputation for being trustworthy. 
 
 
3.  Experimental design and data 
 
As in Glaeser et al. (2003) we use a combination of survey and experimental 
methods. In our experiments, we replicate the original ‘reciprocity game’ of Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), varied in three ways. First, we use an expanded 
version of the pre-survey to elicit information about the causes of creation or 
erosion of trust. Second, we vary the multiplier for reciprocal ‘trusting’ behaviour: 
an equal number of Player B respondents received double, triple and four times 
the original Player A offer. And third, we incentivise trusting behaviour by 
introducing an opportunity for player A to insure against losses. 
 
We conducted 90 investment games in Sheffield and Glasgow in December 
2005 and February 2006. Three hundred and fifty undergraduate and 
postgraduate students in the departments of economics at the universities of 
Sheffield and Glasgow were emailed to invite them to take part in the experiment. 
Those students who indicated that they would like to participate in the 
experiments were provided with a pre-game survey questionnaire to complete 
(see Appendix) which used as point of departure that administered by Glaeser et 
al (2000).  The questions asked included typical personal and family background 
characteristics such as age, ethnicity, parental education and income (captured 
as a one-zero variable by inquiring whether the student had taken the maximum 
available student loan). In addition, we wished to assess the individual’s level of 
altruism, personal social capital, and political attitudes, captured through 
questions on immigration levels and capital punishment. Finally, we included a 
question from the World Values Survey standardly used to measure trust scores 
on a cross-sectional basis: 
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 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people’? 
 
In total 180 students responded to the questionnaire, a response rate of just over 
fifty percent. This enabled us to play 90 games, 54 games at Sheffield and 36 at 
Glasgow, using in each case a double-blind procedure similar to that employed 
by Berg et al (1995) and Cochard et al (2004). Nine of these games were single-
shot games (one offer from player A, and one response from player B);   in the 
remaining 81 cases, this basic game was repeated, with the opportunity for 
player A to purchase insurance against lack of reciprocity being offered in 35 of 
these cases. This insurance offer was made in the form: 
 
Do you wish to consider taking out insurance, to cover the possibility that you 
may not receive from player B as much as you offered?  
If you pay a premium of £1 you will get back the full amount you offered minus 
the premium should player B not return the full amount of your offer. If you pay a 
premium of 50p you will get back half of the amount you offered, minus the 
premium, if player B returns less than the amount you offered. 
 
Individuals who completed the survey questionnaire were invited to take part 
in the experiment. For each game our subjects were randomly selected as player 
A and player B and seated in separate rooms. No players knew the identity of the 
person with whom they were playing: only the experimenter and the monitor were 
aware of this as they passed the offers between each player. Each player 
received an initial endowment of £5, and the amount given by player A to player 
B was multiplied by a factor of either 2, 3 or 4, in order to vary the incentive to 
trust. The ratio of the amount given to player B by player A to his/her initial 
endowment was recorded. Similarly the amount returned by player B to player A 
was recorded and the ratio of the amount given to the amount available to give 
was calculated. In round 2 of the repeated games both players received a 
second amount of £5 which was added to their then current balance and the 
game play was repeated.  In the insurance game player A was offered, in both 
rounds, the opportunity to insure against the possibility of being ‘exploited’ by 
player B – i.e. having his offer not reciprocated. This insurance took the form of 
an insurance premium of either £1 or 50p to cover all or half the amount ‘lost to 
exploitation’, as per the rubric above3.  We focus our attention on analysis of our 
repeated games in this paper and especially the behaviour of player A when he 
faces the opportunity to insure against losses, for the main reason stated by Cox 
(2004 p262) that “…the single-game experimental designs used to generate the 
data in these experiments do not discriminate between actions motivated by trust 
or reciprocity …” Table 1 below shows summary statistics for our single game 
and repeated games. 
                                               
3 We do not concern ourselves with the strict definition of fair and unfair insurance in this paper. We are 
more concerned with the opportunity player A has to insure against losses. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for all games. 
 Repeated games N=78 Single game N=9 
Final balance player A(£) 14.30 8.36 
Final balance player B (£) 18.79 14.22 
Final balance joint (£) 33.10 22.58 
Player A: ratio of initial  offer 
to initial endowment 
0.77 0.72 
Player B: ratio of first-round 
return to first-round 
endowment (after multiplier 
applied) 
0.44 0.29 
Player A: ratio of second-
round offer to second-round 
endowment 
0.40 - 
Player B: ratio of second-
round offer to second-round 
endowment  
0.31 - 
Proportion male 0.63 0.67 
Proportion on maximum loan 0.07 0 
Proportion postgraduate 0.56 0.44 
World Values Survey 
trust measure4 
3.05 2.89 
 % who regularly vote    26     33 
 
 
4.  Results 
 Consistent with the findings of other investigations (Cochard et al 2004), we 
see from the summary statistics shown in table 1 that the ratio of the amount 
offered by player A and that returned by player B is greater in the repeated game 
than in the single game. Table 2 shows the mean statistics for all our games 
separately. Our figures reveal similar final balances for both individuals, 
separately and jointly between the non-insurance game and the insurance game 
where player A did not take up the opportunity to insure. In all our games, we find 
that in the first round of play the ratio of the offer made to the amount available to 
offer made by player A is greater than the ratio in the second round of play, 
which can be explained in terms of a reputation effect: players learn through the 
rounds to do as they expect to be done by. In addition, in the first round of play 
the ratio of the return made by player B to the amount available to offer is always 
                                               
4
 This measures answers to the question:  
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people’?  measured on a five point Likert scale. 
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greater than the ratio in the second round of play, which is explained by the 
reciprocity hypothesis where reciprocity is shown initially by player B in an effort 
to demonstrate reciprocity and to entice player A to offer a high amount in the 
subsequent period. The final return made by player B does not need to indicate 
trust and player B may be opportunistic in the end game, a result found by others 
(Anderhub et al 2002; Cochard et al 2004).  
 
Table 2: Mean statistics for repeated games with and without insurance 
 No insurance Insurance game 
  
N = 46 
Not taken 
N= 18 
Insurance taken 
N= 17 
Final balance player 1 13.30 13.11 17.34 
Final balance player 2 18.33 17.33 20.18 
Final balance joint 31.63 30.44 37.51 
Ratio 1 player A offer 1 0.77 0.70 0.80 
Ratio 2 player B return 1  0.43 0.39 0.51 
Ratio 3 player A offer 2 0.38 0.37 0.40 
Ratio 4 player B return 2 0.33 0.29 0.33 
Mean of means taking multiplication factor of offer into account 
 
In this paper we are particularly interested in how player A behaves, and in 
how she responds to incentives which enable her to increase her risk efficacy 
and protect herself against potential exploitation. Table 3 reports the difference in 
player A‘s offer in respect of each round according to the multiplication factor to 
which the reward is subject. A clear pattern is observable: whilst the ratio of the 
second offer is always below that of the first offer, it clearly increases with the 
level of reward. Thus it appears that trusting behaviour is not a constant, but is 
affected by the level of payoff.  If the player can insure against losses he will not 
be worried about losses and will try to maximise the amount that may be returned 
to him. We suggest that this demonstrates a strategy of attempting to maximise 
one’s own payoff: the higher offer made by player A signals trust in, and a sense 
of fair play towards, player B but is conditioned and incentivised by the fact that 
she is insured. As player A is insured why then does she not give all her possible 
funds available to player B? This may be because player A is inequality-averse 
and realises that if player B does not return a positive amount then she will be 
considerably worse off in relation to the final balance of player B. 
 
Table 3: Player A behaviour when insurance taken, classified by 
multiplication factor applied to Player A’s offer. 
 Multiplication factor Mean proportion 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X2 0.70 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X2 0.30 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X3 0.82 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X3 0.48 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X4 0.94 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X4 0.53 
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Table 4a and 4b reveal estimates for simple regressions of the log of the final 
balance of player A and the log of the joint balance for the insurance games in an 
attempt to understand whether ‘reciprocal trust’, in the sense of participants’ 
combined final balances, can be seen as incentivised by the level of reward and 
by the opportunity to insure against losses, controlling for the ratio of amount 
offered and returned to the amount available at each stage. We build our final 
specification by adding one variable at a time, which allows us to check the 
robustness of our estimates.  Our results demonstrate that all estimates are 
indeed robust across specifications.5 
   
Table 4a Player A - repeated game with insurance 
 
Dependent variable = Ln Final balance player 1. OLS estimation 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
N=35 games  Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Level of reward 0.331*** 0.231*** 0.229*** 0.252*** 
 (0.071) (0.063) (0.059) (0.054) 
Ratio 1 player A 
round 1 
 0.749*** 
(0.184) 
0.727*** 
(0.171) 
0.563*** 
(0.161) 
Ratio 2 player B 
round 1 
  0.477** 
(0.195) 
0.323* 
(0.182) 
Ratio 3 player A 
round 2 
   0.222 
(0.193) 
Ratio 4 player B 
round 2 
   0.473** 
(0.195) 
Insurance taken 
by player A 
   0.161* 
(0.082) 
Constant 1.664*** 
(0.214) 
1.420*** 
(0.186) 
1.226*** 
(0.190) 
1.056*** 
(0.178) 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.58 0.64 0.71 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
 
 
Interestingly, the first offer ratio and the final return ratio are the most important of 
our ratios of amount given to amount available to give and are both highly 
significant, thus lending support to both the reputation hypothesis and the 
reciprocity hypothesis, with the coefficient higher on the opening offer than the 
final return. 
                                               
5 Four specifications reported here. A full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
 - 10 -
Table 4b Joint final balance - repeated game with insurance 
 
Dependent variable = Ln Joint Final balance. OLS estimation 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
N=35 games  Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Level of reward 0.418*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 
 (0.075) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) 
Ratio 1 player A 
round 1 
 0.984*** 
(0.165) 
0.989*** 
(0.167) 
0.835*** 
(0.161) 
Ratio 2 player B 
round 1 
  -0.118 
(0.190) 
-0.293 
(0.183) 
Ratio 3 player A 
round 2 
   0.343* 
(0.194) 
Ratio 4 player B 
round 2 
   0.179** 
(0.194) 
Insurance taken 
by player A 
   0.186** 
(0.083) 
Constant 2.205*** 1.884*** 1.933*** 1.838*** 
 (0.226) (0.167) (0.186) (0.179) 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.74 0.74 0.78 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
 
We wondered why, given the opportunity to insure, more player A’s did not 
take up this opportunity. We have attempted to identify determinants of taking up 
insurance, and in particular whether our measures of social capital taken in our 
pre-game survey could be influential. This was done by running a simple probit 
model. Table 5 shows the results of our probit model of the probability of taking 
insurance given that the insurance game was being played. Once again we test 
the robustness of our estimates by added our covariates one at a time. We find 
no significant difference between males and females in the probability of insuring. 
Our correlates of trust, the World Values Survey measure of trust and whether 
the subject votes are both significant and work in the direction we expected. That 
is,  participation in voting and being more trusting of others both lead to a lower 
probability of taking up insurance. Thus it appears that voting - an indicator of 
community-oriented behaviour - leads to a higher probability of trusting behaviour 
and hence to a lower likelihood of insurance. The World Values Survey trust 
measure, which has been claimed to be a weak measure of trust with respect to 
the amount sent by each player in the experimental trust game (Glaeser 2000) 
performs extremely well in these games as an indicator of whether or not player 
A will take advantage of an opportunity to insure. The coefficient on this measure 
is highly significant and also robust across specifications indicating that the more 
predisposed to trust, in a World Values Survey sense, is player A the less likely 
she is to insure against losses. 
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Table 5: Probability of player A taking out insurance 
 
Dependent variable = Probability of taking insurance offer.  Probit estimation 
Specification: 1 2 3 
N=35 Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Male 0.265 
(0.449) 
0.028 
(0.512) 
0.415 
(0.581) 
WVS trust  -0.801*** 
(0.281) 
-0.983*** 
(0.315) 
Vote   -1.249* 
(0.706) 
Constant -0.210 
(0.365) 
2.273** 
(0.970) 
2.851 
(1.083) 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.24 0.32 
***/**/* Indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate whether trust can be incentivised; more 
specifically, whether introducing a third party who acts as an insurance agent or 
a motivator  into the traditional BDM investment game can influence the outcome 
of the game by reducing the exposure to risk faced by the first player in that 
game. We conducted investment games under experimental conditions within the 
department of economics at the universities of Sheffield and Glasgow during 
2005/2006. Our results indicate that trust can be incentivised, in the sense that 
first-player offers within the context of a repeated BDM game are significantly 
larger if they show evidence that the fear of exploitation of their trust has been 
overcome by material incentives which increase their risk efficacy.  
In particular, trust increases with the size of the multiplier offered as a return 
on the initial investment, and willingness to trust is also higher in cases where a 
third party offers insurance against the possibility that initial offers will not be 
reciprocated. Third parties have the ability to influence the outcome of the game, 
not only, as in the analysis of Charness et al (2008), by punishing failure to 
reciprocate and rewarding ‘good’ offers, but also by offering protection which 
strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy. Thus, it appears from this evidence 
that trust varies in relation not only to personal characteristics, which often 
cannot be altered, but in relation to institutions, which can. On this small-scale 
experimental evidence, there is an upward-sloping supply curve, in relation not to 
trust – which indeed cannot be bought – but rather in relation to institutions which 
protect the truster’s risk efficacy, or defences against exploitation. These findings 
appear tempting but are urgently in need of further robustness-testing against a 
broader sample of respondents.  
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Appendix A. Draft questionnaire . 
 
Name……………                                                 Email……………………….. 
 
 
Note: these personal details are for our reference only and will not be 
passed on to anyone else 
There are three parts to the questionnaire, concerned with personal 
background, attitudes and experience.   There is space for you to add any 
material you wish by way of clarification. 
 
A. Personal background 
 
1. Male/Female……………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Neighbourhood in which you live 
(please just give the last two lines of your address e.g. ‘Bearsden, Glasgow’ or 
’Beaminster, Dorset’) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
3. Are you aged 25 or over? Yes/No 
 
4. Father’s occupation ……………….. 
……….……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5. Mother’s occupation………………………………………………………………. 
 
6. Father’s educational level (please circle highest qualification) 
Doctorate/Master’s degree/First degree (BA or BSc)/A levels/GCSEs/No GCSEs 
 
7. Mother’s educational level (please circle highest qualification) 
Doctorate/Master’s degree/First degree (BA or BSc)/A levels/GCSE/No GCSEs 
 
8. Ethnicity (please circle or write in whichever applies) 
White/Asian (UK national)/Black(UK national)/Other (please 
specify)……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
9. During your secondary school education, did you live at home with both 
parents? Yes……………………….. No………………………………………… 
 
10. While you were at secondary school, did you often feel your family had to 
struggle to maintain a reasonable standard of living? 
 
1 Always 2 Often 3 Sometimes 4 Very 
occasionally 
5 Never 
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11. Describe the type of degree you are taking at Sheffield (tick one): 
 
BA Economics single 
honours…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
BSc Economics single honours………………………………………………….. 
 
BA Business Studies single honours…………………………………………….. 
 
BA Economics with   (                                       ) combined honours 
[please fill in other subject of dual degree]…………………………………….. 
 
MA in…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Other degree course (please specify)…………………………………………….. 
 
 
12. What influenced your choice of degree programme? 
(if any of these factors relevant, please fill in boxes as 1, 2, 3 etc. to indicate the 
order in which they influenced you ) 
 
Love of the subject                        
 
Potential usefulness of the subject 
 
 
Advice from school 
 
Advice from university staff 
 
 
Advice from parents 
 
Advice from students taking the course 
 
Advice from students who have  
finished the course 
 
 
 
 
13.  OVERSEAS POSTGRADS PLEASE IGNORE Does your student loan 
exceed the statutory minimum (currently £4000/year? Yes/no 
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B. Personal and political attitudes 
 
Please say whether you agree strongly or disagree strongly with the following 
statements, entering your feelings on the five-point scale: 
 
14. I feel that the Government needs to take additional measures to restrict the 
level of immigration into this country 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
15. I feel that the Government needs to spend more on health and education and 
less on other purposes 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
16. I feel that the Government needs to spend more or law, order and policing 
and less on other purposes 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
17. I feel that the Government needs to spend more on overseas aid in support 
of developing countries 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
18. I believe that the level of social security benefits should be increased 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
19. I believe that the death penalty should be restored 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
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20. If applicable (OVERSEAS POSTGRADS PLEASE IGNORE), please say for 
whom you cast your vote at the last election (May 2005) 
Please circle or write in for whom you voted 
 
Labour Liberal 
Democrat 
Conservative Other party 
(please write 
in) 
Eligible but 
did not vote 
 
 
 
Do not write in this 
box if you were 
not qualified to 
vote (eg you were 
under 18) 
 
 
 21. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 
 
(Please enter your feelings on 5-point scale) 
 
 1 Can’t be 
too careful 
2 
 
3 4 5 Most people can be 
trusted 
 
22. Suppose that you experience a sudden financial shock – for example your 
book bills are much higher than expected, or you are involved in a car accident 
for which you have to pay the excess. Setting aside any support from your family, 
do you expect your friends and fellow students to help share the shock with you 
or not? 
 
(Please enter your feelings on 5-point scale) 
 
1 None would 
help 
2 3 Some would 
help 
4 5 All or nearly 
all  would  
help 
 
23. What career do you expect to follow after graduation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
24.  When you graduate do you expect your salary to be: 
 
1 Under 
£10,000 per 
annum 
2 £10,000-
£15,000 per 
annum 
3 £15000-
£25000 per 
annum 
4 £25000-
£35000 per 
annum 
5 More than 
£35000 per 
annum 
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25. In 2013 (ie five years after graduation) do you expect your income level to be: 
 
1 Under 
£15,000 per 
annum 
2 £15,000-
£25,000 per 
annum 
3 £25000-
£35000 per 
annum 
4 £35000-
£50000 per 
annum 
5 More than 
£50000 per 
annum 
 
26. In 2018 (ie ten years after graduation) do you expect your income level to be: 
 
1 Under 
£20,000 per 
annum 
2 £20,000-
£35,000 per 
annum 
3 £35000-
£50000 per 
annum 
4 £50000-
£70000 per 
annum 
5 More than 
£70000 per 
annum 
 
 
 
27. How certain do you feel of achieving the income you mentioned under 22? 
(please tick one of the following) 
 
I am very confident of achieving that figure……………………………………….. 
I am reasonably confident of achieving that figure………………………………. 
I am not at all certain, it is just my best guess…………………………………….. 
Any additional 
observations………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
C. Experience and ‘social history’ 
 
 
28. Have you taken part in activities on behalf of a charity organisation (fund-
raising, voluntary work, distributing publicity etc.)? 
A ‘charity organisation’ is any non-profit, non-waged activity (community 
development, medical, overseas development, animal welfare, educational, etc.)  
 
If yes please give the name of the organisation…………………………………. 
 
And describe the activities………………………………………………………. 
 
How many hours per week do you spend on these 
activities?……………………………………………………….. 
 
29. Do you belong to any clubs or affinity groups, outside of school and university 
(church choirs, sports clubs, etc...)  Yes /no 
 
If yes, please describe 
which…………………………………………………………………………… 
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30. Have you joined any clubs or affinity groups within the University? Yes/no 
 
If yes, please describe which………………………………………………………. 
 
31. Do you have friends from other ethnic groups?………………………Yes/No 
 
32. Do you have friends from other countries, outside the UK?............. Yes/No 
 
33. How often do you leave your door unlocked? 
 
Very often  Often Sometimes  Rarely Never 
 
34. How often do you lend money to friends? 
 
More than 
once a week 
About once a 
week 
About once a 
month 
Once a year 
or less 
Never 
 
35. How often do you lend personal possessions (CDs, clothes, bicycle etc) to 
friends? 
 
More than 
once a week 
About once a 
week 
About once a 
month 
Once a year 
or less 
Never 
 
 
 
36. In general, do you see yourself as a trusting 
person?……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
37. Are you able to say 
why?………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix B.  Experimental procedure 
 
 1: All participants convene in the ‘base room’. The overall procedure of the game 
is outlined i.e. the purpose for our experiments, how the game is to be played, 
how participants will be rewarded etc… 
 
2: Participants are divided into Player As and Player Bs. The experimenter 
assigns them into pairs, but the identity of these pairs is known only to the 
experimenter and monitors.  
 
3: Players A and B each go to their assigned rooms. A ‘routine’, and a 
corresponding recording sheet is assigned by the experimenter to each pair. 
 
4: One monitor works with the Player As. First the monitor assesses, for each 
player A, their level of risk aversion. The following hypothetical choice is offered: 
a certainty of £5 versus a 50% chance of £10 or nothing 
If the player chooses the certainty, s/he is asked: ‘How much of the certain 
income would you be prepared to give up rather than face the risky bet? 
If the player chooses the gamble, s/he is asked: ‘How much more should the 
certain income be for you to choose the certain income rather than the bet?’ 
The resulting measure of risk-aversion is recorded on recording sheet 1.   
 
5: Next the monitor lays out £5 on the table in coins and asks player A to offer 
any desired part of this to another player. The identity of the other player is not 
specified: Player A is only told that his/her ‘partner’ is a student within the 
University, that the amount invested will be doubled/ tripled/quadrupled, and that 
player B is free to return as much or as little as s/he desires. Each player A is 
asked how much s/he expects to get back.  
 
6: The amount offered, once multiplied, is then ‘transferred’ to Player B The 
game is repeated once. 
 
7: Each round player A’s offer and player B’s return is recorded.  
 
8: A second monitor records Player B’s return. Each Player B receives an initial 
stake of £5. In addition s/he receives the multiplied offer from Player A.  S/he 
decides how much of this offer to return to Player A.  
 
9: At the conclusion of the game each player is informed of their ‘final balance’ 
and they are presented with a provisional IOU corresponding to this balance.  
 
10: At the conclusion of all our games 
(i) the IOU is completed 
(ii) bank transfer form is handed out 
(iii) completed questionnaire is requested, if appropriate (payment of bank 
transfer cannot be made until this is handed over). 
 - 21 -
 
11: In the insurance game we repeat the stages above but at stage five player 
A’s are given the opportunity to take out insurance. They are asked “Do you wish 
to consider taking out insurance, to cover the possibility that you may not receive 
from player B as much as you offered? If you pay a premium of £1 you will get 
back the full amount you offered minus the premium should player B not return 
the full amount of your offer. If you pay a premium of 50p you will get back half of 
the amount you offered, minus the premium, if player B returns less than the 
amount you offered.” Player B is aware that they are participating in an insurance 
game but do not know whether player A has taken advantage of the option to 
insure.  
 
